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court interpreted the CWA as creating a cooperative process between
the EPA and states for the establishment of TMDLs. The court
declared that Virginia had in fact participated in establishing the
TMDL schedule as it had previously issued a Memorandum of
Understanding ("MOU"). The Virginia MOU detailed goal dates for
the development of TMDLs for state waters. In comparing the MOU
with the settlement, the court determined that the two schedules were
consistent; the settlement merely refined a schedule implied by the
MOU. As a result, Virginia had clearly participated in establishment of
TMDL deadlines.
In addition, a liberal interpretation of the CWA by the court
indicated that it is within EPA's authority to establish a TMDL when
the state has refused to act for an extended period of time. The court
regarded a state's failure to comply with the schedule as a constructive
submission that no TMDLs are necessary, consequently allowing the
EPA to establish the appropriate TMDL. If this were not the case, the
court concluded that a state's mere refusal to submit a TMDL could
render the CWA dead. This would clearly produce an absurd result.
Therefore, the court held that EPA did possess the authority to enter
into an agreement concerning the establishment of TMDLs and the
settlement between plaintiffs and EPA was not illegal.
The court also determined that the settlement was reasonable and
adequate. First, the settlement gave Virginia primary authority to
establish TMDLs. However, the default to the EPA in absence of state
actions ensured the establishment of TMDLs consistent with the
purpose and requirements of the CWA. In addition, the process
outlined by the settlement required public notice and opportunity for
public comment. The court concluded that the settlement agreement
provided a reasonable approach to fulfilling the requirements of the
CWA with due authority given to both Virginia and the EPA.
Therefore, the court granted the motion to enter the consent decree.
SarahE. McCutcheon

Waste Action Project v. Clark County, 45 F.Supp.2d 1049 (W.D. Wash.
1999) (holding that county's failure to timely obtain NPDES storm
water permit violated Clean Water Act).
Clark County owns and operates a municipal storm sewer system
that discharges stormwater runoff. The discharges contained copper,
lead, and zinc exceeding legal limits. Clark County submitted part I of
an application for a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit to the Department of Ecology ("Department") in
June 1997. The Department then extended the deadline for filing the
application's part II until October 1998.
Waste Action Project ("WAP") and Clark County Natural
Resources Council ("CCNRC") are two non-profit citizen groups
dedicated to the preservation, protection, and enhancement of the
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natural environment. They served Clark County with notice of intent
to sue, as required by the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), more than 60
days before they filed suit, claiming that Clark County violated the
CWA by failing to obtain a NPDES permit.
In its defense, Clark County asserted that notice was insufficient.
The CWA requires that the notice contain sufficient information to
allow the alleged polluter to determine what standards they have
violated, the persons responsible for the alleged violation, and
locations where the violations occurred.
According to state law, the head of Clark County is the Board of
County Commissioners ("Board"). WAP and CCNRC sent complete
notice to the county's managing agent as well as the Environmental
Services Director, but the Board's notice did not contain an
attachment identifying the locations of the specific alleged violations.
The court held notice sufficient. Since WAP and CCNRC sent
complete notice to the individuals who were primarily responsible for
the alleged violations, they satisfied the CWA's notice requirements,
and adequately informed the Board of the alleged violations, even
without the detailed attachments. Therefore, the court granted
plaintiff s motion for summary judgment on this issue.
Clark County next argued that the environmental groups did not
have standing to sue. To satisfy associational standing requirements, a
group must establish that: (1) its members would have individual
standing; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
group's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor the relief sought
requires participation of individual members. Here, the court found
that the only disputed element was whether WAP's and CCNRC's
members had individual standing to sue.
To establish this element, a plaintiff must show they have suffered
an "injury in fact" caused by the alleged misconduct, and that the
injury will likely be "redressed by a favorable decision." Since the
contaminated discharges affected members' recreational use of nearby
waters, the court found they suffered an injury. Additionally, the court
recognized that plaintiffs established causal connection between Clark
County's discharges and their injuries, although additional possible
sources of pollution to those waterways existed. The court concluded
that even though Clark County submitted part II of its NPDES permit
application, the lawsuit was not moot. Remedy for the injuries was
possible because submitting an application did not guarantee that
Clark County would receive a permit. Therefore, the court held that
the plaintiffs had standing.
Clark County next argued that they fit a statutory exception from
CWA's permit requirements due to their stormwater system. Realizing,
however, that both the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of Ecology required Clark County to apply for an NPDES
permit, the court refused to second-guess the agencies'
determinations. Therefore, the court held that Clark County was
required to obtain a NPDES permit.
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Finally, the court concluded that Clark County violated the CWA.
Liability under the CWA requires that a party must: (1) discharge; (2)
pollutants; (3) to navigable waters; (4) from point sources; (5) without
an NPDES permit. Since all elements were present in this case, the
court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and found
Clark County liable for violating the CWA.
Michael Fischer

STATE COURTS
ALABAMA
Cove Properties, Inc. v. Walter Trent Marina, Inc., 702 So. 2d 472
(Civ. App. Ala. 1997) (holding that the trial court erred in applying
the two-year residual statute of limitations to allegations derived from
a claim of riparian rights of access to the waters of Terry Cove by virtue
of ownership of property directly facing Terry Cove).
Cove Properties, Inc. ("Cove") appealed from a judgment
dismissing its claims against Walter Trent Marina ("Marina") on the
basis that Cove's claims were barred by the two-year residual statute of
limitations. Cove and the Marina were adjoining landowners of
property fronting Terry Cove in Orange Beach, Alabama. The Marina
had erected a pier that crossed a line extending into the water of Terry
Cove from the parties' land boundary.
Cove sued under various theories all based upon its riparian water
rights of access to the waters of Terry Cove by virtue of its ownership of
property directly facing Terry Cove. The lower court dismissed the
action as barred by the two-year residual injury statute of limitations.
On appeal, Cove argued that its claims should not be subject to the
statute of limitations. Cove analogized its riparian rights to access the
water fronting its lot to the rights of a fee simple landowner to
possession of his or her land, arguing that its claims should be subject
to the statute of limitations governing recovery of interests in land, or,
alternatively, trespass to real or personal property.
In reviewing Cove's claims, the court held that the rights Cove
sought to vindicate were appurtenant to its riparian tract and were
corporeal hereditaments inuring to its tract. Thus, the ten-year
statute of limitations for actions for the recovery of lands, tenements,
or hereditaments, or the possession thereof, properly applied.
CarolinePayne

